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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION--SPOUSE'S RELOCATION DUE TO

EM-

PLOYMENT IS A COMPELLING PERSONAL REASON CONSTITUTING GOOD
CAUSE FOR VOLUNTARY TERMINATION-Ayers

v.

Department of Em-

ployment Security, 85 Wn. 2d 550,536 P.2d 610 (1975).

Claimant Robert B. Ayers and his wife resided in Richland, Washington, where he held a temporary, seasonal job with a landscaping
company, salaried at approximately $480 per month. Prior to the end
of the company's work season and the forced termination of claimant's job,1 Mrs. Ayers was offered permanent employment at a salary
of $412 per month in Olympia, Washington, a distance of approximately 250 miles from their Richland residence. The couple agreed
that Mr. Ayers would quit his job and that they would move to
Olympia. 2 Unable to find work in the Olympia area, Mr. Ayers filed
for unemployment benefits but was denied immediate eligibility because of failure to establish good cause for the voluntary termination
3
of his employment, as required by R.C.W. § 50.20.050.
On administrative appeal from the state Employment Security
Department's denial of immediate benefits, the claimant alleged that
his desire to preserve his marriage was good cause for his voluntary
resignation and that the departmental policy requiring a husband to
show actual threat to his marriage, while automatically finding good
cause in the case of a wife who voluntarily terminated her employment to follow her husband to a new domicile, 4 violated the equal
protection clauses of both the state and federal constitutions. 5 The
1. See Brief of Appellant at 4, Ayers v. Department of Empl. Sec., 85 Wn. 2d 550,
536 P.2d 610 (1975).
2. Id. at 4-5. Their decision was based on their weighing of the advantages of Mrs.

Ayers' career opportunity in Olympia over those of Mr. Ayers' short-term employment
prospects in Richland, their determination that they could neither afford to maintain
two separate domiciles nor commute weekly, and a mutual desire to maintain their
marital relationship.
3.

WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050 (1974) provides:

An individual shall be disqualified from benefits beginning with the first day of the
calendar week in which he has left work voluntarily without good cause and there-

after until he has obtained work and earned wages of not less than his suspended
weekly benefit amount in each of five calendar weeks: Provided, That disqualification under this section shall not extend beyond the tenth calendar week following
the week in which such individual left work.
4. In re Bale, 63 Wn. 2d 83, 385 P.2d 545 (1963) (legal duty of the wife to follow her
husband to his chosen domicile was good cause for her voluntary termination of em-

ployment). See text accompanying notes 20-23 infra.
5. Although Ayers argued his case on equal protection grounds, the court sidestepped the constitutional issues, see note 9 infra, and declined to comment on the con-

tinuing validity of the Bale ruling that the legal duty of the wife to accompany her hus-
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appeal tribunal rejected these contentions and upheld the departmental denial of immediate benefits. 6 The department commissioner
and the Thurston County Superior Court both affirmed. 7 Upon
transfer of the case from Division Two of the Court of Appeals, a
divided Washington State Supreme Court reversed. 8 Held: Claimant's
band is good cause for her voluntary resignation. See 85 Wn. 2d at 552, 536 P.2d at 611.
Whether a female claimant may now establish good cause for leaving work by merely
alleging that she has a legal obligation to follow her husband is not clear. Ayers holds
that either spouse has good cause as long as the decision as to which spouse should terminate employment is reasonable. 85 Wn. 2d at 552-53, 536 P.2d at 612. If a wife still has
a legal duty to accompany her husband, this obligation alone may continue to be sufficient to render her resignation reasonable, and her burden of proving good cause therefore remains substantially less than that imposed on the husband.
The passage of the equal rights amendment (ERA), WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, however, suggests that a wife may no longer be legally bound to follow her husband. Section
I of that amendment provides: "Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall
not be denied or abridged on account of sex." In discussing the proposed Federal ERA,
it has been stated:
The basic principle of the Equal Rights Amendment is that sex is not a permissible factor in determining the legal rights of women, or of men. This means that
the treatment of any person by the law may not be based upon the circumstance
that such person is of one sex or the other.
Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 889 (1971), cited for interpretation
of the Washington State ERA in Singer v. Hara, II Wn. App. 247, 256-57 & n.9, 522
P.2d 1187, 1193 & n.9 (1974) (affirming denial of marriage license to persons of the
same sex).
Sex classifications, valid under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution through application of the suspect classification and
fundamental interest doctrines, may now be invalid under the Washington ERA. See
Dybwad, Implementing Washington's ERA: Problems with Wholesale Legislative Revision, 49 WASH. L. REV. 571, 574 n.10 (1974); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wn. 2d 859, 540 P.2d
882 (1975) (exclusion of students from athletic competition solely because of their sex
violates Washington's ERA). Thus, the ERA may give the husband and the wife an equal
right to select the family domicile, so that neither will have a legal duty to follow the
other. See Brief of Respondent at 21-22, Ayers v. Department of Empl. Sec., 85 Wn. 2d
550, 536 P.2d 610 (1975); Gary L. Price, Review No. 20701, IV MANPOWER ADM'N, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, BENEFIT SERIES SERV.-UNEMPL. INS. VL-155.2-185 (Comm'r of
Wash. Empl. Sec. Dep't, June 7, 1974), rev'g Dkt. No. 3-083 10 (App. Trib., Feb. 14.
1974). The absence of such a legal duty would nullify the basis for the Bale decision
and, under Ayers, the wife would be required to meet the same standard of reasonableness as the husband.
The effect of the ERA on the Bale holding was not at issue in Ayers, since the amendment was approved in November 1972, six months after claimant Ayers had filed his
claim for unemployment benefits. The court's broad holding that one spouse may have
good cause to quit work to follow the other spouse indicates that the court may have anticipated a future ERA challenge and chose to word the Ayers holding in language sufficiently broad to apply the burden of proof of "reasonableness" to wives as well as to
husbands.
6. Robert B. Ayers, Dkt. No. 72-5252 (Aug. 17, 1972).
7. Robert B. Ayers, Review No. 10789-X (Dec. 28, 1972), affd, Ayers v. Employment Sec. Dep't, No. 47646 (Jan. 22, 1974).
8. Chief Justice Stafford, Justices Finley, Rosellini, and Hunter, and Justice Pro
Tem Rummel joined Justice Wright in the majority opinion. Justice Hamilton, joined
by Justices Utter and Horowitz, dissented.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Hamilton-perhaps in response to the breadth of the
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decision to follow his wife to the location of her work was a compelling personal reason for terminating his employment, establishing
good cause within the meaning of R.C.W. § 50.20.050, and entitling
him to benefits without an intervening period of disqualification. 9
Ayers v. Department of Employment Security, 85 Wn. 2d 550, 536
P.2d 610 (1975).
This note will analyze the impact of Ayers upon the traditional dual
administrative test of "no alternative" and "preservation of employment" 10 used to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances, "compelling personal reasons"' meeting the statutory
requirement of good cause for voluntary termination of employment
exist. Although the Washington court did not discuss this test, the
Ayers decision should not be construed as a rejection of its continued
vitality. In addition, this note will analyze the factors which should be
considered when applying the "no alternative" and "preservation of
employment" standards to spouse relocation situations in the wake of
Ayers. It concludes that a more careful adherence to established admajority's holding, see note 5 supra-statedthat the existence of a compelling personal
reason sufficient to justify voluntary resignation was "a factual question to be resolved,
virtually on a case-by-case basis." 85 Wn. 2d at 554, 536 P.2d at 612. Although the dissent did not completely reject the majority's reasoning that separation of the family unit
cannot be presumed to be a reasonable alternative to voluntary termination of employment, see text accompanying notes 47-48 infra, it concluded that on the facts of the case
claimant Ayers had failed to carry his burden of proof by demonstrating that temporary
separation would threaten his marriage adversely, affect any children involved, or otherwise cause unreasonable inconvenience.
The implication of the dissenting opinion that family separation may be presumed to
be a reasonable alternative to unemployment in some circumstances merits further consideration. See note 50 infra. Such instances may be limited, however, to those few cases
where separation will be relatively short in duration, since permanent or lengthy separation of the family will almost inevitably place stress on marital-familial relationships
and strain upon family finances.
9. As indicated earlier, see note 5 supra, Ayers argued his claim on the grounds of
denial of equal protection; the Washington Supreme Court, however, framed the issue of
the case as: "whether there were sufficient compelling personal reasons to constitute
'good cause' for appellant to quit his job." 85 Wn. 2d at 551, 536 P.2d at 611.
10. In general, this test requires the claimant to show that he or she had no reasonable alternative to voluntary resignation after making a reasonable effort to discover a
solution enabling him or her to preserve the employment status. For further elaboration
and for examples of the utilization of the test in Washington, see the text accompanying
notes 18-25 infra.
11. Since the facts of the Ayers case did not involve voluntary termination due to
unsuitable work-related factors as established by WASH. REv.CODE § 50.20.100 (1974),
e.g., risk to health or to safety or prior training in a different job, this note will not deal
with the elements of good cause arising out of the claimant's employment situation. For
discussion in this area, see Packard, Unemployment Without Fault: Disqualifications
for Unemployment Insurance Benefits, 17 VILL. L. REV. 635, 638-44 (1972); Note,
Unemployment Insurance: Good Cause for Leaving Employment, 20 CLEV. STATE L.
REV.597 (1971).
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ministrative tests is necessary to ensure that awards of unemployment
compensation benefits are made in accordance with the articulated
12
objectives of the state unemployment compensation law.
I. BACKGROUND
The Washington Supreme Court, prior to Ayers, had held that the
elements of a showing of good cause necessary to justify voluntary
termination of employment under R.C.W. § 50.20.050 are not limited
to work-related bases13 but may include "compelling personal reasons."14 Although the court has found compelling personal reasons to
exist under a variety of specific circumstances,' 5 it has given little
6
guidance as to the general nature of a compelling personal reason.'
Administrative decisions, however, have been more helpful in stressing
the need to differentiate compelling personal reasons from reasons of
mere personal convenience. 17 The claimant who alleges that compel12. The majority and dissenting opinions in Ayers agreed that the purpose of the
unemployment compensation system is to relieve "economic insecurity" and to protect
"against this greatest hazard of our economic life." 85 Wn. 2d at 552, 553, 536 P.2d at
611, 612. The dissent, however, stressed that involuntary unemployment was the principal concern. See text accompanying notes 35-41 infra.
13. Twenty-six states have statutes or regulations which specifically restrict good
cause to reasons related to work or attributable to the employer-employee relationship.
See MANPOWER ADM'N. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE LAWS 4-6, 4-27, 4-28 (Rev. 1974 & 1975) [hereinafter cited as COMPARISON].

Courts in a number of states with statutes similar to WASH. REV. CODE §50.20.050,
which do not expressly define good cause, have restricted good cause to work-related
reasons. See, e.g., Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Olsen, 141 Neb. 776, 4
N.W.2d 923 (1942); Stone Mfg. Co. v. South Carolina Empl. Sec. Comm'n. 219 S.C.
239, 64 S.E.2d 644 (1951); Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Cochran Foil Co., 331
S.W.2d 903 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960). Moreover, statutes in twelve states expressly exclude
marital, filial, or other domestic reasons, including moving with one's spouse, as possible bases for good cause. See COMPARISON, supra, at 4-44; see generally Annot., 13
A.L.R.2d 874. 876-80 (1950).
14. In re Bale, 63 Wn. 2d 83, 89-90, 385 P.2d 545, 548-49 (1963). Since 1945, the
policy of the Washington State Employment Security Department has been to interpret
good cause to include compelling personal reasons. Id. at 88-89, 385 P.2d at 548. See
also text accompanying notes 20-23 infra.
15. The Bale court limited itself to the facts of that case, viz., the wife left her job at
Boeing Airplane Co. in Seattle, Washington, to join her husband in Oakville, Washington, where he had taken a teaching position. See 63 Wn. 2d at 91, 385 P.2d at 549,
note 4 supra.
16. See Matison v. Hutt, 85 Wn. 2d 836, 838-39, 539 P.2d 852, 853-54 (1975). in
which the court declared that good cause cannot be defined with exactness but must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. Accord, Ayers, 85 Wn. 2d at 554, 536 P.2d at 612
(Hamilton, Utter, & Horowitz, JJ., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., Judith G. Bird, 8 Comm'r Dec. No. 814 (Feb. 19, 1970), affg Dkt. No.
70-754 (App. Trib., Dec. 5, 1969) (inability to visit friends and relatives due to increased working hours was noncompelling personal inconvenience); Brian L. Butcher.
Dkt. No. 70-9943, 10 UNEMPL. INS. REP. (Wash.) 8483 (App. Trib., May 4, 1971). pe-
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ling personal reasons have led to voluntary termination of employment must manifest a sincere desire to protect his or her employability.1 8 To do so, he or she must meet the dual test of "no alternative"
and "preservation of employment:" 19
Compelling personal reasons imply circumstances of such a nature
that [afford an individual] no alternativebut to leave his employment.
[I] t must be established that the individual made every reasonable effort to preserve the employee-employer relationship.
Accordingly, to establish good cause in pre-Ayers cases in which one
spouse quit work to follow the other to a new location, the claimant
had to prove that no viable alternative to termination of employment
existed. For the wife, this was a relatively simple matter, in view of the
Washington court's decision in In re Bale.20 There the court upheld a
long-standing administrative policy21 that the legal duty22 of the wiff
titions for review dismissed, Review No. 9441 (Comm'r of Empl. See. Dep't, July 20,
1971) and No. 741703 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County, Mar. 20, 1972) (inability to attend school due to distance of school from job site was mere personal reason).
Utilization of the distinction between compelling personal reasons and reasons of

personal convenience is important to effectuate the unemployment compensation system's goal of alleviation of suffering caused by involuntary unemployment. An individual who voluntarily resigns and remains unemployed for mere personal convenience
is not involuntarily unemployed. See text accompanying notes 34-41 infra; Ayers, 85
Wn. 2d at 553-55, 536 P.2d at 612-13 (Hamilton, Utter & Horowitz, JJ., dissenting).
18. See, e.g., Ernest R. Fields, 7 Comm'r Dec. No. 756, 10 UNEMPL. INS. REP.
(Wash.)
8429 (July 11, 1968), rev'g Dkt. No. 68-2399 (App. Trib., July 2, 1968)
(claimant established sincere desire to protect his employability when, faced with imminent dismissal because of wage garnishment, he discussed his problem and its possible
solutions with his employer).
19.

Franklin H. Jensen, Dkt. No. 3-10259 at 2, IV MANPOWER ADM'N, U.S. DEP'T

VL-360-115 at 115-16 (Wash. App.
Trib., Jan. 16, 1974) (emphasis added), petitionfor review dismissed, Review No. 20593
(Comm'r of Empl. Sec. Dep't, Feb. 8, 1974) (admitted alcoholic had compelling personal reason to resign where job duties might have caused him to resume drinking). See
also Casey v. Employment See. Dep't, No. 736576, 10 UNEMP. INS. REP. (Wash.) 8503
(Wash. Super. Ct., King County, Nov. 20, 1972) (claimant who needed medical assistance held to have left work without attempting to preserve his employment where he
could have obtained such assistance in the vicinity of his employment); Carl E. Buxton,
7 Comm'r Dec. No. 799 (Wash. Empl. Sec. Dep't, Sept. 3, 1969), rev'g Dkt. No.
69-2206 (App. Trib., July 3, 1969) (claimant had no alternative but to quit work where
his wife's health required that she move to a different locality).
20. 63 Wn. 2d 83, 385 P.2d 545 (1963).
OF LABOR, BENEFIT SERIES SERV.-UNEMPL. INS.

21.

See, e.g., Mary L. Crepeau, 5 Comm'r Dec. No. 510, 10 UNEMPL. INS. REP.

(Wash.)
8342.05 (July 19, 1962), affg Dkt. No. A-46601 (App. Trib., May
31, 1962); Kathleen D. Seeley, I Comm'r Dec. No. 165 (Wash. Empl. Sec. Dep't, Feb.
8, 1955), rev'g Dkt. No. A-26669 (App. Trib., Jan. 10, 1955); Clara A. Hopper,
Dkt. No. A-14992, 10 UNEMPL. INS. REP. (Wash.) 1 1975.054 (App. Trib., Apr.
5, 1949).
22. The Washington court has held that the husband has the right to select the family
domicile, that the wife has a duty to accompany and live with him in his chosen home,
and that failure of the wife to carry out her duty to live with her husband constitutes

395

Washington Law Review

Vol. 51: 391, 1976

to follow her husband to the domicile of his choice was a compelling
personal reason for the voluntary termination of her employment and
therefore constituted good cause within the meaning of R.C.W.
§ 50.20.050.23 Whether a husband could properly claim that following
his wife was good cause for his voluntary resignation was not at issue
in Bale; however, administrative policy indicated that the husband
could establish good cause in such a situation only where the separation of the spouses would result in "a real threat to the marital relationship. 2 4 Absent such a threat, the husband could not immediately
abandonment. Buell v. Buell, 42 Wash. 277, 84 P. 821 (1906). Prior to 1973, abandonment for one year was specific grounds for divorce in Washington. See ch. 215, § 2,
[1949] Wash. Laws 698, repealed by ch. 157, § 30, [1973] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.
1228. See generally Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 474 (1953). Since the passage of WASH. CONST.
art. XXXI, § 1, the equal rights amendment, the continued imposition of this legal duty
upon the wife has become doubtful. See note 5 supra.
23. Decisions in Massachusetts under a statute similar to Washington's are in accord. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Director of Div. of Empl. Sec., 346 Mass. 733, 196
N.E.2d 196 (1964); Raytheon Co. v. Director ofDiv. of Empl. Sec., 344 Mass. 369, 182
N.E.2d 293 (1962). In Bliley Elec. Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review.
158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A.2d 898 (1946), a Pennsylvania superior court also found.
under a statute similar to WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050 (1974), that the wife's legal duty
to follow her husband was good cause for voluntary termination. The Bliley decision
was superseded by legislation responding to this per se rule, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 802(b)(2) (Prudon's Supp. 1975), disqualifying a claimant who leaves work to join
his or her spouse in a new locality. See Raytheon, supra, 196 N.E.2d at 198 n.l. See
also notes 41 & 50 infra.
In other states with similar statutes, courts have not found good cause, despite acknowledgment that the wife has a legal duty to follow the husband, on the grounds that
good cause is restricted to work-related rather than personal reasons and that the unemployment compensation law does not relieve the husband of his reciprocal legal duty to
support his wife. See, e.g., note 13 supra and cases cited therein.
24. Ayers, Dkt. No. 72-5252 at 3 (App. Trib., Aug. 17, 1972). Administrative decisions dealing with a husband's termination of work to join a wife who has established
new employment elsewhere are few. In Gary L. Price, Review No. 20701, IV
MANPOWER

ADM'N,

U.S.

DEP'T

OF LABOR,

BENEFIT SERIES SERV.-UNEMPL.

INS.

VL-155.2-185 (Comm'r of Wash. Empl. Sec. Dep't, June 7, 1974), rev'g Dkt.
No. 3-083 10 (App. Trib., Feb. 14, 1974), benefits were denied after claimant and his
wife agreed to and did move to her place of employment. The commissioner found that
the circumstances influencing claimant's decision to terminate lacked "sufficient compulsion" to constitute good cause. Because the husband was required to show actual
danger to his marriage, the commissioner viewed the mutuality of the decision as an indication that claimant's personal reasons for leaving his job were not "compelling personal reasons." This reasoning is reflected in Justice Hamilton's dissent in Ayers:
"Based upon this mutual agreement, and without any kind of ultimatum from his wife.
claimant quit his job ....
" 85 Wn. 2d at 555, 536 P.2d at 613. Cf. Tobe Nettles. 4
Comm'r Dec. No. 490 (Wash. Empl. Sec. Dep't, Dec. 12, 1961), rev'g Dkt. No.
A-44379-T (App. Trib., Nov. 28, 1961), where benefits were granted after
claimant's wife refused to accompany him to his new place of employment. The commissioner decided that claimant quit work for good cause because his only alternative
was to retain employment at the cost of initiating divorce proceedings. See also LeRoy
C. Seeley, I Comm'r Dec. No. 166 (Wash. Empl. Sec. Dep't, Feb. 8, 1955), rev'g Dkt.
No. A-26668 (App. Trib., Jan. 10, 1955), in which claimant established good
cause for voluntarily terminating his employment, where, after his wife initiated divorce
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qualify for unemployment benefits, even if his only alternative to
leaving work was a lengthy, if not permanent, physical separation
25
from his wife.
II.

AYERS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DUAL TEST FOR
COMPELLING PERSONAL REASONS

The Ayers court eliminated the requirement that the husband show
an actual threat to the marriage by declaring that as long as employment for both spouses is not available in the same vicinity, "it is a
compelling personal reason and, therefore, good cause for one of the
spouses to leave employment and go to the place of employment of
the other spouse .... ,"26Thus, the mere fact that jobs for both the
husband and wife are not available in the same area is sufficient as a
matter of law to bring a spouse's voluntary resignation within the
realm of good cause, if it is necessary to keep the family together and
the decision to resign is reasonable. 27 In so holding, the court was silent on the utilization of the "no alternative" and "preservation of
employment" standards in this context. 28 The Ayers decision should
not, however, signal an end to the utility of these standards in ascertaining compelling personal reasons constituting good cause or in
maintaining the integrity of the unemployment compensation system.
A repudiation of these standards would make claimants eligible for
unemployment compensation immediately after resignation without
attempting to arrive at an accommodation of their personal problems
in order to continue employment. This result would clearly contravene the purpose of the unemployment compensation system to aid
proceedings against him, claimant persuaded her to move away with him in order to be
free from local pressures which were destroying their marriage. The commissioner
stated:
It would appear beyond any question of doubt that where the husband and wife
manifest a desire to protect their marriage from impending dissolution, that such a
desire, in fact, constitutes a personal compelling reason for taking any and all necessary lawful measures to so preserve the marriage.

I Comm'r Dec. No. 166, at 3 (emphasis in original).
25. The requirement that the husband show "a real threat to the marital relationship" indicates that mere physical separation of the spouses was not a sufficiently compelling reason to justify voluntary resignation. See cases cited in note 24 supra.
26.

85 Wn 2d. at 552, 536 P.2d at 611-12 (emphasis added).

27.
28.

Id. at 552-53, 536 P.2d at 612. See text accompanying notes 52-54 infra.
The court had notice of the "no alternative" and "preservation of employment"

standards. See Brief of Respondent at 11-12, Ayers, 85 Wn. 2d 550, 536 P.2d 610

(1975).
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only those who are involuntarily unemployed. 29 That the dual test is
valuable in preserving the integrity of the unemployment compensation system is demonstrated by the following cases of resignation for
domestic reasons other than spouse relocation.
In Ivy L. Winberg,30 the claimant voluntarily quit work to spend
more time with her asthmatic children. The appeal tribunal found that
she had not established good cause for resignation because she had
not discussed her problem with her employer. According to administrative policy, where an individual's domestic obligations create unusual problems, that person has a responsibility 3' to approach the em32
ployer and attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution.
In George S. Liapis,33 claimant's wife left home, leaving him to
care for their two young children. Claimant voluntarily quit work to
move to New Hampshire, where he had relatives who could provide
him with the necessary child care. The appeal tribunal determined
that since the claimant had not made sufficient attempts to obtain
child care in the area of his employment, he had failed to establish a
compelling personal reason for leaving his job.
In the Winberg and Liapis decisions, the dual test served to ensure
that the claimants had explored all reasonable alternatives to unemployment before arriving at the ultimate decision to resign. Moreover,
the test ensures in all cases that benefits will not be paid unless the
reason for a claimant's voluntary resignation is, in fact, compelling.
The need to determine that, despite a sincere desire to remain employed, a claimant had no alternative but to resign is consistent with
the purpose of the Employment Security Act, 34 which provides for a
29. See text accompanying notes 34-41 infra.
30. Dkt. No. 68-104, 10 UNEMPL. INS. REP. (Wash.)
8445 (App. Trib., Aug. 24,
1967), affd, 7 Comm'r Dec. No. 731 (Sept. 21, 1967), affd, No. 56805 (Wash. Super.
Ct., Grays Harbor County, Aug. 1, 1969).
31.
7 Comm'r Dec. No. 731 at 2, 10 UNEMPL. INS. REP. (Wash.) 8445 at 50,693
(Sept. 21, 1967).
32. Such a solution might be in the nature of a leave of absence or a change in
working hours. See also James H. Anderson, Review No. 6938, 10 UNEMPL. INS. REP.
(Wash.) 8386.07 (Comm'r of Empl. Sec. Dep't, Nov. 10. 1964), setting aside Dkt. No.
A-53335 (App. Trib., Oct. 5, 1964), denying claimant benefits pursuant to WASH.
REV. CODE § 50.20.050 because claimant had not informed his employer of a physical condition which required him to move from Seattle to a drier climate. The commissioner found that the employer, which maintained installations in areas suitable to claimant's condition, was entitled to an opportunity to transfer him to a more healthful work

situs.
33. Dkt. No. A-17412, 10 UNEMPL.
Trib. of Empl. Sec. Dep't, Apr. 14, 1950).
34. WASH. REV. CODE tit. 50 (1974).
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compulsory reserve of funds "to be used for the benefit of persons
unemployed through no fault of their own . . . . 35 Compensable
36
unemployment under this scheme is divided into two categories: (1)
unemployment, the initial cause of which is beyond the control of the
employee, 37 and (2) unemployment which, regardless of its initial
cause, continues through no fault of the employee. 3 8 The fact that
these categories of unemployment are insured reflects the basic principle of unemployment compensation "that the only unemployment
whose cost industry should not be called upon to bear is unemployment which is the worker's fault, i.e., unemployment caused by the
worker's own unreasonable act . . . ,,19 Whether the worker has
been unreasonable is based, at least in part, on whether his conduct is
consistent with a sincere desire to maintain his employability or
whether his actions indicate a desire to "take it easy" at the expense of
contributing employers. 40 Allowing claimants to draw benefits when
they could have continued employment without unreasonable inconvenience would undermine the fundamental tenet of the unemployment compensation laws: that only those persons involuntarily unem41
ployed should be compensated.
35.
36.
(1963).
37.

Id. § 50.01.010 (emphasis added).
Reply Brief of Appellants at 12-13, In re Bale, 63 Wn. 2d 83, 385 P.2d 545
See generally WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.045-1. 10 (1974).
E.g., unemployment due to layoff by the employer may be compensable. WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 50.20.0 10 et seq. (1974).
38. E.g., unemployment due to discharge for misconduct or to voluntary resignation without good cause may be compensable beyond the tenth calendar week following
the week in which the individual became unemployed. See WASH. REV. CODE §§
50.20.050, .060 (1974).
39. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BES No.
U-212, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LEGISLATIVE POLICY 62 (1962). See generally Harrison, Forenote: Statutory Purpose and "Involuntary Unemployment", 55
YALE LJ. 117 (1945); Kempfer, Disqualificationsfor Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct,
55 YALE LJ. 147, 148-59 (1945).
40. See Kempfer, supra note 39, at 150-51. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.080
(1974).
41. This notion follows generally-accepted social policy. See Kempfer, supra note
39, at 150. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (1974). In addition to pressure from employers to proscribe payments to those who, have contributed to their own unemployment, general public dissatisfaction with liberal eligibility requirements can and does
lead to the enactment of stricter disqualification provisions. See L. ADAMS, PUBLIC
ATTITUDES TOWARD UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 69-74 (1971). In New York, for example,
N.Y. LABOR LAW § 593 (McKinney 1965), which disqualifies a claimant who follows his
or her spouse to another locality, was enacted in reaction to Shaw v. Lubin, 6 App. Div.
2d 354, 177 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1958), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 1014, 158 N.E.2d 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d 267
(1959), which allowed benefits to a woman who had left work to marry and move to her
husband's chosen domicile. See In re Russo's Claim, 236 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (App. Div.
1963) (dissenting opinion). New Jersey and Pennsylvania also enacted restrictive legislation in response to court decisions that family obligations may justify voluntary resig-
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The court's failure in Ayers to expressly apply or discuss the dual
test, although perhaps attributable to the particular factual circumstances of the case, 42 has already led to deviation from the purpose of
the Employment Security Act in at least one decision. In Alexander v.
Employment Security Department,43 claimant Alexander and his wife
resided in Seattle, where he had a temporary carpentry job. Although
the claimant had only two weeks remaining in his term of employment, he quit work to move with his wife to Burlington, approximately 65 miles from their former home, where she had accepted a
teaching position. Alexander failed to allege, as had Ayers, that his
family could not afford to maintain two separate homes or that he
could not commute to work during the two weeks remaining in his
employment. Unlike the Ayers case, nothing in the record suggested
that the claimant would suffer unreasonable inconvenience had he
completed his term of employment. 44 Nevertheless, a stipulated judgment, entered in favor of the claimant, was requested by the department on the ground that the factual situation before the court was "in
all substantialrespects indistinguishablefrom Ayers. .... ,,45
The result in Alexander suggests that the Washington Employment
Security Department has construed Ayers to repudiate its own administrative standards for a compelling personal reason constituting good
cause for voluntary termination of employment. Certainly the relatively close proximity of Seattle and Burlington, the shortness of
claimant's remaining term of employment, and the lack of proof of any
marital, familial, or financial hardship expected from the short separanation. See Raytheon Co. v. Director of Div. of Empl. Sec., 196 N.E.2d 196, 198 n.l
(Mass. 1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(a) (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 802(b)(2) (Purdon's Supp. 1975). See also note 8 supra.
42. The court may have concluded sub silentio that claimant Ayers had no reasonable alternative but to quit work and that the nature of his job precluded him from successfully preserving it. As the dissenting opinion and prior decisions on the claim indicate, however, there was room for differing opinions on these matters. See note 51 infra.
43. No. 35447, 10 UNEMPL. INS. REP. (Wash.)
8619 (Wash. Super. Ct.. Skagit
County, July 28, 1975), rev'g Burt F. Alexander, Dkt. No. 4-10037 (App. Trib., Nov.
12, 1974), and Review No. 21894 (Comm'r of Empl. Sec. Dep't, Feb. 11, 1975).
44. The factual circumstances in Alexander may be found in Dkt. No. 4-10037
(App. Trib., Nov. 22, 1974). Briefly, claimant was receiving $5 per hour at the time of
termination and was satisfied with both his pay and hours of work. His wife would have
moved to Burlington to accept the teaching position, salaried at $725 per month, even if
claimant had not accompanied her. The evidence did not indicate that claimant had to
accompany her at the time she moved in order to preserve their marriage, nor that he
consulted with his employer at the time of his termination as to the amount of time he
could reasonably expect to remain employed.
45. Stipulated Judgment at 1, Alexander v. Employment Sec. Dep't, No. 35447
(Wash. Super. Ct., Skagit County, July 28, 1975) (emphasis added).
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tion were factors which indicated that Alexander's decision, as distinguished from Ayers', was based on reasons of personal convenience.
Nevertheless, on the basis of Ayers, the department did not believe
Alexander's decision could be proved unreasonable. 4 6 As indicated,
Alexander appears distinguishable from Ayers, and it is unfortunate
that the court's failure to discuss the dual test may have obscured not
only the policy bases of its decision but also the requirement that the
decision to terminate be reasonable.
In eliminating the former administrative requirement that a husband show an actual threat to his marriage in spouse relocation cases,
the court in Ayers took notice of the substantial public interest in
keeping a family together. It decided that where employment for both
spouses is not available in the same area the State cannot presumefor the purposes of determining unemployment compensation eligibility-that separation of the family is a reasonable alternative to
48
unemployment.4 7 As Justice Wright stated in the majority opinion:
It is often a substantial factor to be considered that it is desirablefor
numerous reasons to keep the family together. If employment for the
husband and for the wife are [sic] not available in the same area, it is
a compelling personal reason and, therefore, good cause for one of the
spouses to leave employment and go to the place of employment of the
other spouse in order to keep the family together.
The mere fact that one spouse must relocate in order to accept new
employment, however, need not compel the other spouse to terminate
employment in every instance. As the following section demonstrates,
46. Since Ayers, the Washington Employment Security Department and interested
employers have dropped or conceded several spouse relocation cases because of the difficulty in ascertaining a standard of reasonableness consistent with the court's decision.
Thus, the court's failure to expressly apply the dual test or to formulate factors relevant
to a workable standard of reasonableness may lead to determinations of benefit eligibility without the consideration of reasonableness mandated in Ayers. Because of these
difficulties, the department is presently considering draft legislation which would expressly eliminate accompanying one's spouse to a new domicile as good cause for voluntary termination of employment. Interview with Barbara Phillips, Assistant Attorney
General, State of Washington, in Seattle, Nov. 25, 1975.
47. In basing its decision on the public interest in preserving the family unit, the
Ayers court implicitly followed the reasoning of the Bale decision, which was tacitly
based on the public interest in preservation of marriage. See note 22 supra. Compare
Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Olsen, 141 Neb. 776, 4 N.W.2d 923 (1942),
with Kathleen D. Seeley, I Comm'r Dec. No. 165 (Wash. Empl. Sec. Dep't, Feb. 8,
1955), rev'g Dkt. No. A-26669 (App. Trib., Jan. 10, 1955) (husband and
wife's agreement to move to another town in order to preserve their marriage held to
constitute good cause for voluntary termination of wife's employment).
48. 85 Wn. 2d at 552, 536 P.2d at 611-12 (emphasis added).
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several factors should be examined in determining whether the dual
test is met and whether the decision to terminate is reasonable so that
immediate eligibility is warranted.
III.

RELEVANT FACTORS IN SPOUSE RELOCATION
CASES

The Washington court's finding that employment-related separation
of the spouses cannot be presumed to be reasonable warrants critical
reconsideration. As the dissenting opinion implied, 49 a vulnerable aspect of the court's reasoning is its assumption that in spouse relocation
situations either separation of the spouses or termination of employment is inevitable. In this respect, it is important to recognize factors
that indicate there may be less drastic alternatives. For instance,
where the distance between the work sites of husband and wife is not
great, the family may be able to re-establish residence midway between the two locations; alternatively, where an employer maintains
several installations, the spouse electing to terminate employment may
request a transfer to a site more conveniently located with respect to
the other spouse's place of employment.50 Such solutions would satisfy
both the Ayers goal of preserving the family unit and the administrative goal of minimizing unemployment and its ill effects. 5 1 Inasmuch
as Ayers did not raise the issue of whether one spouse may establish
49. See id. at 555. 536 P.2d at 613.
50. In addition, situations may exist where the separation of the spouses due to different employment localities will be for only a short period of time so that the separation will result in no substantial impact upon the family finances, or upon filial or marital relationships. See 85 Wn. 2d at 553, 555, 536 P.2d at 612. 613 (Hamilton, Utter, &
Horowitz, JJ., dissenting).
Fourteen states have statutes either expressly disqualifying or deeming "unavailable"
individuals who quit work due to marital obligations. See COMPARISON, supra note 13,
at 4-44. New York, California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Utah specifically disqualify a claimant who quits work to follow a spouse. See N.Y. LABOR LAW
§ 593 (McKinney 1965); CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE § 1264 (West 1975); IDAHO CODE
§ 72-1366(c) (1973); NEv. REV. STAT. § 612.415(2)(a), (b) (1973); ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 657.176(3)(b) (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(b)(2) (Purdon's Supp. 1975);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-5(i) (1966). See also note 41 supra.
51. The failure of the Ayers court to consider these possible alternatives may be due
to the factual circumstances of that case. The 250 mile distance between the job sites of
claimant Ayers and his wife was beyond reasonable commuting distance and, in any
case, Ayers was certain to be laid off work at or before the end of the work season.
There was no evidence that Ayers' employer maintained any branch business in the area
of Mrs. Ayers' employment. Consequently, the court could have concluded that Ayers
had no opportunity to preserve his employment and no alternative but to quit work if he
was to avoid separation from his wife.
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good cause for voluntary termination of employment even if continued employment without a family separation is possible, the Washington court has yet to evaluate the utility of the "no alternative" and
"preservation of employment" standards in spouse relocation cases
where there exist alternatives to family separation and methods for
preservation of employment.
The Ayers decision is sufficiently broad, however, to permit consideration of viable alternatives to family separation or unemployment in
cases where such alternatives do in fact exist, for the court held that
the establishment of good cause depends upon whether the decision as
to which spouse should resign from work is "reasonable" in light of
"all relevant factors.152 It is unlikely that the court would find it reasonable for one spouse to become voluntarily unemployed in order to
accompany the other spouse to a new domicile, where the former
could have both preserved the family unit and retained his or her
employment without undue inconvenience. That a husband or wife
may have a means of preservation of employment, e.g., transfer to a
more conveniently located job site, establishment of domicile in a
more central location or temporary leave of absence, should be a relevant factor in determining whether there exists good cause to voluntarily terminate employment.
The mere existence of an alternative to resignation, however,
should not result in automatic denial of unemployment benefits. The
alternative must be reasonable. A spouse cannot reasonably be expected to transfer to a new job site when the transfer is conditioned on
the acceptance of substantially lower pay or unsuitable duties.5 3 A
family cannot reasonably be expected to establish a new home in
some central location where adequate housing or transportation is not
available. Whether a reasonable alternative is available to an individual and his or her family will, of course, depend upon myriad fac52. 85 Wn. 2d at 552-53, 536 P.2d at 612.
53. The question of whether suitable job factors may or may not be present may be
determined by considering the degree of risk to an individual's health, safety, or morals;

his experience, prior training, prior earnings, or prior working conditions; or the distance between available employment and his residence. See WASH. REV. CODE §§
50.20.100, .110 (1974).
This reasoning is analogous to that found in the context of transferring tenured
teachers from one school setting to another. In Rosenthal v. Orleans Parish School Bd.,
214 So. 2d 203 (La. App.), appeal denied, 252 La. 963, 215 So. 2d 130 (1968), the court

stated that the transfer of a teacher from one position to another constituted removal
from office if a reduction of salary was involved or if the new position required the
teaching of subjects for which the teacher was not qualified.
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tors pertinent to the particular situation, but the decision reached
should be consistent with one which "a normally prudent person
acting under like or similar circumstances"5 4 and with a sincere desire
to protect his or her employability would have made.
IV.

CONCLUSION

After Ayers, separation of the spouses cannot automatically be
deemed a reasonable alternative to voluntarily leaving work where
employment for both spouses is not available in the same area. Yet,
where other alternatives to separation or unemployment do exist, the
reasonableness of the available alternatives is an important consideration in establishing good cause to voluntarily resign. Such options
should be examined under the dual test of "no alternative" and "preservation of employment" as a means of assuring that the personal reason
given for voluntary termination of employment is compelling and not
merely a matter of personal convenience. Utilization of this approach
can help preserve the objective of the unemployment compensation
system: to alleviate only the hardships of involuntary unemployment.
Pamela A. Okano

54. George Zemek, 3 Comm'r Dec. No. 326 at 2, 10 UNEMPL. INS. REP. (Wash.)
8270.12 at 50,508 (July 9, 1956), setting aside Dkt. No. A-30250 (App. Trib..
June 11, 1956), quoted in Laura G. Bale, Dkt. No. A-41215, 4 Comm'r Dec.
No. 452 at 2 (App. Trib., Nov. 22, 1960), affd, In re Bale, 63 Wn. 2d 83, 385 P.2d 545
(1963). See also Western Printing & Lithographing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 260 Wis.
124, 50 N.W.2d 410 (195 1) (applying the reasonably prudent person standard, the court
held an unemancipated minor had compelling personal reason to quit job at parents'
insistence that she move with them to another state).
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